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ru T 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JANINE RAY NOAKES, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs * 
CHARLES LEROY NOAKS, j 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
Case No. 97000080 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred un this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1996). The final judgment was entered on January 
a I Q Q 7 . The Ni * - '*-- -s file-1 wi'hin thirty days of the 
entry of the judgment .« - * ^ ~ therefore timely. Utah k, App„ P. 
4(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. 
Was Mrs. Lindsay o: v 
of the Utah Foreign Judgements A, i
 n seeking :»> 
f c u n p a ^ d alimony under the foreign Decree? 
Wa s M rs I irnlsn y * i \ •-• j
 m p [ e # undocumented reference to the 
additional provisions and segments o^ ^he foreign Decree, without 
. - A ana udgment 
filing or registering them, sufficient for her to "bootstrap" into 
the portion of the Decree filed, such that the requirements of the 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act could be deemed to have been met? And if 
so, was it reversible error for the Trial Court to proceed to hear 
the issues of alimony, where the foreign Decree (alimony) segments 
were not properly filed under the requirements of the Act? 
3. 
Does the Statute of Limitations, as set forth in U.C.A. § 78-
12-29, apply to enforcement of obligations which were not reduced 
to judgment at the time when the Foreign Decree was domesticated in 
Utah? And if it does, does it apply where the unpaid alimony sums 
accrued prior to the registration in Utah apply only a "liability" 
at the time of registration, such that the judicial enforcement is 
barred by the effect of the applicable Statute of Limitations? 
4. 
Did the Trial Court commit reversible error in refusing to 
aPPly (to the past alimony obligations, in this case) the Statute 
of Limitations provisions as set forth in U.C.A. § 78-12-29, and in 
so doing, allowing Mrs. Lindsay to seek relief for an obligation 
not reduced to judgment before the tolling of the statute? 
5. 
Did the Court err in awarding attorney's fees to Mrs. Lindsay, 
without making specific findings as to the parties' relative needs 
and abilities, or some bad faith? 
6. 
Could the Trial Court award attorney's fees to Mrs. Lindsay if 
it did not first have proper jurisdiction on the underlying 
(alimony) issues? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CODE 
Appellant asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l through 9, 
Utah Foreign Judgments Act and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29 (1996) (as 
to the Statute of Limitations) are both specifically applicable to 
this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final order 
of the Fourth District Court, in and for Utah County, issued by 
Judge Howard Maetani, in regard to a Petition for Modification and 
enforcement of a Foreign Decree. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The parties 
obtained a Decree of Dissolution from the Superior Court, State of 
Washington, King County, on or about June 13, 1991. Mrs. Lindsay 
subsequently moved to the state of Utah and Mr. Lindsay moved to 
the state of California (he has never lived in Utah). On or about 
October 18, 1994, Defendant/Appellant registered (pursuant to the 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-l(1953)) in the Fourth 
District Court for the State of Utah, Provo, a 
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certified/exemplified copy of the foreign judgment entitled "Decree 
of Dissolution" (which had three separate segments), but only 
registered the first segment, entitled "Permanent Parenting Plan". 
On or about the first week of June, 1995, Mrs. Lindsay was 
served with a Petition to Modify in the action now registered in 
Utah, which Petition and registration addressed only the issues of 
visitation, custody, transportation costs, and attorney's fees — 
all covered by the one segment properly registered by the Defendant 
in Utah. 
Subsequently, Mrs. Lindsay, but the default was set aside. On 
or about February 9, 1996, she filed a counter claim, without 
complying with the specific filing requirements of the Utah Foreign 
Judgments Act. On or about April 16, 1996, Mrs. Lindsay filed an 
Amended Counterclaim (again without complying with the specific 
requirements of the Utah Foreign Judgments Act), requesting 
additional relief. 
Mr. Noakes raised timely objections to the jurisdictional 
issues (and statute of limitations). Denying these objections 
wholesale, the Trial Court extended jurisdiction to consider the 
issue of alimony. 
A trial was held and at the conclusion of trial, a judgment 
was entered against Mr. Noakes for alimony which accrued prior to 
registration in Utah in the amount of $30,486.30, plus attorneys 
fees and costs. The Trial court entered it's Memorandum Decision, 
finding in favor of Mrs. Lindsay/Appellee as to alimony and 
attorney's fees, and the Court subsequently entered it's Findings 
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of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
C. Statement of Facts. The parties were married on May 9, 
1975 in Los Angeles, California, and subsequently established 
residency in Washington state. 
The parties obtained a Decree of Dissolution from the Superior 
Court, State of Washington, King County on or about June 13, 1991. 
The Plaintiff subsequently moved to the state of Utah and the 
Defendant moved to the state of California. Except for exercising 
visitation with his daughter in the state of Utah, the Defendant 
has had no connections or contacts with the state of Utah. 
On or about October 18, 1994, Defendant/Appellant 
registered (pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-
22a-l(1953)) in the Fourth District Court for the State of Utah, 
Provo, a certified/exemplified copy of the foreign judgment 
entitled "Decree of Dissolution" (which had three separate 
segments), along with only the first segment, entitled "Permanent 
Parenting Plan". 
On or about the first week of June, 1995, Plaintiff was 
served with a Petition to Modify in the action now registered in 
Utah, regarding only the issues of visitation, custody, 
transportation costs, and attorney's fees — all covered by the one 
segment properly registered by the Defendant in Utah. 
Subsequently the Plaintiff defaulted, but the Default was 
set aside. 
On or about February 9, 1996, the Plaintiff filed a 
Counter Claim (without complying with the specific requirements of 
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the Utah Foreign Judgments Act), where the requested relief was; 
a. That the Judgment, Order and Decree entitled "Order on 
Revision re Order on Reconsideration for Child Support", Superior 
Court, State of Washington, King County, be adopted in the Fourth 
District Court, State of Utah; 
b. That she be awarded attorney/s fees" 
On or about April 16, 1996, the Plaintiff filed an 
Amended Counterclaim (again without complying with the specific 
requirements of the Utah Foreign Judgments Act), and requested that 
the orders out of the state of Washington with respect to custody, 
visitation, child support, alimony, and property division be 
adopted under the Utah Foreign Judgments Act. 
Pursuant to the parties' Washington Decree, the Defendant 
was obligated to pay the following, as for maintenance; 
$1,000.00 per month from 10-25-90 until August, 1992. 
$800.00 per month from September 1, 1992, through September 1, 
1993. 
$1,050.00 per month due from September 1, 1993 until September 
1, 1994. 
$400.00 per month from September 1, 1994 until September 1, 
1995. 
The Plaintiff did not at any time file with the Utah 
Trial Court (under the requirements of the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act) certified copies of the separate segment of the parties' 
Decree that dealt with alimony. 
Some of the disputed issues were resolved by stipulation. 
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The remaining unsettled issues (at the time of trial) were alimony 
and visitation rights of the Defendant. The matter came on before 
trial on October 1, 1996. Over the (jurisdictional and Statute of 
Limitations) objections by the Plaintiff, the Court agreed to 
consider the issue of alimony. The Court reserved the issue of 
visitation until such time as the parties had completed mediation, 
and, after taking evidence and testimony, issued a Ruling on the 
remaining issue of alimony arrearages. The Trial Court found that 
alimony was owing by Mr. Noakes, and subsequently entered an award 
for alimony and judgment for alimony arrearages in the amount of 
$30,486.30, plus attorneys fees and costs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court erred in hearing and issuing Judgment on the issue 
of alimony, because the issue was not properly before the Court, 
having never been registered by either party as a foreign Decree. 
The trial court should have applied the U.C.A. § 78-12-29, and 
in fact could not have relied upon U.C.A. § 78-12-22 because there 
was never a judgment for past due alimony from the state of 
Washington. The Trial Court's application of Utah's statues to 
interpret, rewrite or alter a foreign Decree, and reaching back to 
a time prior to when a foreign Decree is registered, is not 
appropriate and should not have been done by the Utah trial Court. 
Essentially, the Trial Court applied the Utah Code 
retroactively and in a manner to alter the foreign Decree: 
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specifically to establish that the pre-registration alimony becomes 
a judgment upon the point at which it becomes due and owing, and 
back to a point in time when Utah did not have jurisdiction over 
the parties or the subject of alimony. Such an application is a 
violation of due process as well as the fact that it is not 
authorized or justified by any application of any Utah Code or 
better case law. 
The award of attorneys fees was not justified by the Findings 
of Fact or Conclusions of Law; and does not reflect the fact that 
the Defendant prevailed on his Petition — rendered as it was, this 
aspect of the Ruling appears to have been made under passion or 
prejudice. 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS OBLIGATED TO FIRST COMPLY WITH 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT 
IN SEEKING REVIEW AND JUDGMENT 
FOR UNPAID ALIMONY UNDER THE FOREIGN DECREE 
Mrs. Lindsay failed to file the required affidavits and failed 
to file a certified copy of the separate segment of the Dissolution 
which dealt with the Separation and Property Agreement (alimony). 
The only document properly filed and before the Court, was the 
Decree of Dissolution and the single segment comprising the 
Parenting Plan, dealing with custody and visitation, which was 
properly filed and registered by Defendant. 
Although a copy of the Separation and Property Agreement was 
provided to the Court and placed in the file, it was not actually 
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filed pursuant to the requirements set forth in the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act. 
This issue is governed by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, 
U.C.A. § 78-22a-l through 3, which states in pertinent part: 
(1), for the purpose of this chapter, 
"foreign judgment" means any judgment, 
decree or order of a court of the United 
States or of any other court who's acts 
are entitled to full faith and credit 
in this state". 
In addition U.C.A. § 78-22a-3 mandates that the counsel for 
the registering party file a certified copy of the foreign document 
and also file an Affidavit with the clerk of court stating the 
last known post-office address of the other party. The Counsel for 
Plaintiff failed to comply with the proper procedures when he filed 
both the Counterclaim and Amended Counterclaim — without the 
support of the Foreign Judgment Act, the claims fall short of 
reaching the level of jurisdiction. 
Having not been properly registered and supported by 
compliance with the provisions of the Act, the alimony segment was 
not properly before the Court, and the Court erred in considering 
and then awarding judgment for the unpaid alimony. Simply 
presenting the document to the Court, does not comply with the very 
specific procedural and notice provisions of the Utah Foreign 
Judgments Act. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
9 
POINT II 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO PROCEED TO HEAR THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY 
WHERE THE FOREIGN DECREE SEGMENTS APPLICABLE TO 
ALIMONY HAD NOT BEEN PROPERTY FILED WITH THE COURT 
The Plaintiff failed to file with the Court the required 
affidavits and failed to file a certified copy of the separate 
segment of Dissolution which dealt with the Separation and Property 
Agreement (as to alimony). The only document properly filed and 
before the Court was the Decree of Dissolution and the single 
segment comprising the Parenting Plan, dealing with custody and 
visitation. 
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
state to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State. 
Created as a mechanism for enforcing this section, the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act, defines a "foreign judgment" as 
any judgment, decree, or order of a court of 
the United States or of any other court whose 
acts are entitled to full faith and credit in 
this state." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-2(l) (1992). 
However, before the said judgment can be enforced in Utah, a party 
must first file it with a clerk of any district court, pursuant to 
the terms set forth in the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-22a- 2(2) (1992). It is only after the proper filing 
occurs that the Act provides that; 
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the clerk of the district court shall treat the 
foreign judgment in all respects as a judgment of 
a district court of Utah," I£. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of this statute 
is to enable "foreign judgments to be treated as if they were local 
judgments once they have been [properly registered and] filed with 
the clerk of a district court-" Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 
L142, 1144 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 
The proper procedure must be followed prior to any party 
having the ability to seek relief in the Court: 
"The demands of due process rest on the concept 
of basic fairness of procedure and demand a 
procedure appropriate to the case and just to the 
parties involved." 
Wiscombe v. Wiscombe. 744 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting 
Rupp v. Grantsville Cityr 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)). 
In examining the necessity of properly following the terms of 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the Court in Holm v. Smilowitz. 840 
P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cited to "Comment at 33. Section 2 
of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964" and 
stated that it; 
is substantially similar to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
Thus, enforcement of a foreign custody decree pursuant to the 
UCCJA must be accomplished in compliance with provisions of 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, which governs the procedure for 
enforcement of all foreign judgments. See, generally, Beck v. 
Smith. 296 N.W.2d 886, 891 (N.D. 1980). This ruling is 
consistent with other states that have held that under the 
UCCJA, a certified copy of the foreign judgment must first be 
filed in the state before the state will recognize and enforce 
it. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pagan. 103 Or. App. 453, 798 
11 
P.2d 253, 255 (1990). Otherwise, nothing could prevent one 
divorced parent from suddenly appearing on the former spouse's 
doorstep with a foreign order in hand, demanding immediate 
change of custody without the custodial parent having an 
opportunity to be heard, or the foreign order tested for 
validity. An order of a judge in one state is simply not 
enforceable in another state until that order has been 
domesticated in the second state. 
Although in Holm the issue was custody and not alimony, the 
discussion regarding the need to follow proper procedure is very 
similar. Applied in the Noakes case now before the Court, the 
Court could logically conclude that unless the certified copy was 
required to be properly filed with and recognized up by the Utah 
Court, along with the Affidavit of the Attorney, nothing would 
prevent a party from appearing essentially ex parte, and demanding 
a judgment for tens of thousands of dollars which may or may not 
have been available to that same party in the foreign state in 
which the Decree was issued. 
Nothing prevented Mrs. Lindsay from taking the proper 
procedural steps to obtain judicial review in Washington state, and 
making application for a judgment in that state and then, if 
entitled to and granted a judgment, then filing it in Utah. 
Nothing prevented Mrs. Lindsay from properly filing the applicable 
section of the Decree she wished to have enforced in Utah -
pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
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POINT III 
THE STATUTE OJ* LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH IN 
U.C.A. § 78-12-29 SHOULD BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE, 
TO THE REQUEST FOR A JUDGMENT FOR ALIMONY BECAUSE 
THE ARREARAGES WERE ONLY A "LIABILITY11 
AT THE TIME OF TRIAL 
Even if Mrs. Lindsay had properly filed the Foreign Decree -
as to alimony, a judgment should not have been entered. 
The U.C.A. § 78-12-29 requires that Plaintiff's action seeking 
judgment via the enforcement of the Defendant's liability on the 
Decree of Divorce, should have been brought "WITHIN ONE YEAR [for] 
(l)"An action for liability created by the statutes of a foreign 
state". 
The liability created by the parties' Washington Decree was as 
follows; 
$1,000.00 per month from 10-25-90 until August, 1992. 
$800.00 per month from September 1, 1992 through September 1, 
1993. 
$1,050.00 per month due from September 1, 1993 until September 
1, 1994. 
$400.00 per month from September 1, 1994 until September 1, 
1995. 
Mrs. Lindsay's Counter Claim that requested relief was; 
a. That the Judgment, Order and Decree entitled "Order on 
Revision re Order on Reconsideration for Child Support", Superior 
Court, State of Washington, King County be adopted in the Fourth 
District Court, State of Utah; 
b. That she be awarded attorney's fees. 
Then on or about April 16, 1996, the Plaintiff filed an 
Amended Counterclaim (again without complying with the specific 
13 
requirements of the Utah Foreign Judgments Act), and requested that 
the orders out of the state of Washington with respect to custody, 
visitation, child support, alimony, and property division be 
adopted under the Utah Foreign Judgments Act. 
The Defendant's alimony obligation to the Plaintiff ceased on 
September 1, 1995 (and all arrears prior to February, 1992, were 
eliminated by Order of 25 March, 1992). Because the Plaintiff 
initiated (by unregistered counter claims) the action regarding 
alimony on February 9, 1996, she is limited, if in fact entitled to 
any relief, by the statute of limitations to recovery 12 months 
prior to her initiation of the action, provided that she properly 
plead and raised the issue of a judgment for arrearages. However, 
Mrs. Lindsay has only requested that the court "adopt" the Foreign 
Decree. 
On April 16, 1996, Plaintiff simply requested that the entire 
foreign Decree be "enforced", but still did not properly register 
the segments, and did not ask for a specific judgment. Plaintiff 
finally but for the first time formally requested a judgment at the 
time of trial, (held October 1, 1996) — even were this last minute 
pleading sufficient, she would still be limited to one-year prior 
to the October, 1996, request at trial. In that case, the 
Defendants alimony obligation/liability would have expired prior 
to the Defendant's request for Judgment, as it expired (by 
stipulation of the parties) September 1, 1995, a full year prior to 
trial — and the Statute ran out a month prior to late request at 
trial. 
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There is ample case law which addresses the issue of statutes 
of limitations, and the choice of which state's statute of 
limitations should apply. 
Pan Energy v Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, (Utah Supreme Court, May, 
1991), addressed the issue of domestication of a foreign Judgment 
(where the amount owing had already been rendered to judgment) and 
the effect the domestication has upon the Judgment, which held: 
The clerk of the district court shall treat the foreign 
judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district court of 
Utah. A judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect 
and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and 
proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or 
staying, as a judgment of a district court of this state and 
is subject to enforcement and satisfaction in like manner. 
Therefore, even if the Mrs. Lindsay properly filed the Decree, 
and could be said to have met the specific requirements of the 
Foreign Judgment Act, by requesting in the Counterclaim (filed on 
or about February 9, 1996), that the Washington Decree "be adopted" 
by the Utah Court, the alimony segment of the Decree, remained an 
"obligation" only, and had not been reduced to a Judgment in any 
state. 
In the Pan Energy case, cited above, the original Order (from 
the state of Oklahoma), when rendered to Judgment by Utahr had 
exceeded the statute of limitations in Oklahoma. However, Utah's 
statute of limitations was longer than that existing in Oklahoma. 
The Supreme Court ruled that once a foreign judgment is filed with 
Utah Court's, the laws of Utah applied and not the laws of 
Oklahoma. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Pan Energy as follows: 
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The Utah Foreign Judgment Act provides a mechanism for the 
enforcement of a foreign judgment in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-22a-2(2) (1987) provides in part: 
The clerk of the district court shall treat the foreign 
judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district court of 
Utah. A judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect 
and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and 
proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or 
staying, as a judgment of a district court of this state and 
is subject to enforcement and satisfaction in like manner. 
(Emphasis added.) This statute requires foreign judgments to 
be treated as if they were local judgments once they have been 
filed with the clerk of a district court. Once filed, the 
foreign judgment is subject to the same procedures to attack 
or enforce it as a Utah judgment. Thus, because foreign 
judgments properly filed in Utah essentially become Utah 
judgments under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the Utah 
statute of limitations applies to the enforcement of those 
judgments in Utah. ID. 
In Pan Energy, the Supreme Court also referred to the case of 
Stanford v. Utley. 341 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1965), as follows; 
In Stanford, Judge (now Justice) Blackmun wrote: "We feel 
that registration provides, so far as enforcement is 
concerned, the equivalent of a new judgment of the 
registration court." 341 F.2d at 268. Stanford was a diversity 
case in which the court looked to the law of Missouri, the 
state where the judgment had been registered, for the 
applicable statute of limitations. Although the judgment was 
unenforceable in Mississippi, the state where rendered, the 
court allowed enforcement of the judgment because the Missouri 
statute of limitations had not yet expired. 341 F.2d at 268. 
In Pan Energy, the Utah Supreme Court also addressed the issue 
of the theory that U.CA. § 78-22a-8(1987), (Uniformity of 
Interpretation) raised by the defense, that Utah's method of 
enforcement of a foreign judgment must be the same as the foreign 
state's method, that is essentially that Utah must enforce the 
statute's of the original state, when they held; 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act provides that it "shall be 
construed to effectuate the general purpose to make uniform 
the law of those states which enact it." Clearly, the Act does 
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not make foreign statutes applicable in Utah. Rather, its 
policy is to provide a simple and uniform method for enforcing 
foreign judgments in states that enact the Foreign Judgment 
Act. The Utah Foreign Judgment Act simply requires that 
foreign judgments filed in the state be treated the same as 
local judgments in all respects, including the applicable 
statute of limitations regarding enforcement. 
While in Pan Energy the issue was clearly "statute of 
limitations", it is dicta that would guide the court in any issue 
in dispute where the Utah Foreign Judgment Act is involved. In the 
instant case, the issue is alimony, and therefore, as to the issue 
of alimony, the Utah Court is bound by the application of the Utah 
statute of limitations, as it applies in this case. 
The Restatement of Conflicts Laws provides that "the local law 
of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another 
state is enforced" Restatement (second) of Conflicts of Laws, §99, 
1969. 
The rational behind this section is described in comment a, b, 
and c of § 99, which states: 
a. Rational. The method by which a sister State judgment is to 
be enforced are determined by local law of the forum, subject to 
the qualification that they cannot be made so complex and expensive 
as to make enforcement of a sister state judgment unduly difficult 
(citing Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). 
Although the parties Decree of Divorce required Defendant to 
pay alimony, even beyond the Plaintiff's remarriage, the Plaintiff 
has never had the arrearages reduced to Judgment, and the 
obligation of the Plaintiff to act on the Defendant's liability, 
once registered as a foreign Decree in Utah, and to render it to 
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Judgment, had a one-year Utah statute of limitations to seek 
Judgment for any claimed arrears. 
Should the Utah court then choose to render any judgment 
against the Defendant, he would then have the right to assert any 
Utah defenses he may choose against the judgment — including the 
application of the Statutes of Limitations, restricting the scope 
of the Utah Court's reach, and the court's ability to render a 
judgment. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION 
AS SET FORTH IN U.C.A. § 78-12-29 
The trial court cited two cases in justifying it's reliance 
upon the avoidance of the Statutes applicable to foreign judgments 
(one year statute), and in support of it's choice and application 
and use of U.C.A.§ 78-12-22 (eight years statute of limitations). 
The first case was Logan v. Schneider. 609 P. 2d 943 (Utah 
1980). The Logan case can be distinguished from the Noakes 
situation. in Logan, the Plaintiff sought an order which would 
require Defendant to pay child support. Later a child support order 
was entered, in Ohio. 
Later, (again in Ohio), the Plaintiff filed with the Ohio 
court a motion claiming arrearages in child support payments in the 
amount of $4,695, and the Ohio Court entered a judgment against 
Defendant, granting plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $4,905. 
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The Plaintiff then moved to Utah and sought enforcement of the 
specific Ohio judgment against Defendant. 
The Defendants claims in Logan was that the claim was new in 
Utah and thus untimely. However, the distinction between Noakes 
and Logan) is both critical and clear. In Logan the Utah Supreme 
Court applied the applicable statute of limitation that was 
effective in the state of Ohio, and because Ohio "courts have 
explicitly held that in Ohio there is no statute which prescribes 
that judgments or actions on judgments (including court-ordered 
support payments) are subject to any limitation. ...The 1975 action 
is therefore not barred." The Utah Supreme Court in Logan applied 
the Ohio statute of limitations. 
The latter case of Pan Energy established that it is now the 
Utah Statute of Limitations that are applicable to foreign 
judgments and orders. Therefore, Logan would not be applicable to 
Noakes. 
Although the Court in Logan also cited the Utah Code as to 
statute of limitations, and observed that in Utah the action would 
not have been barred (because it was brought within 8 years), the 
Logan Court expressly found that the Ohio statutes applied to a 
review of the Ohio Judgment, even in Utah. This is no longer the 
law. 
The trial Court in this instant matter, also cited to Seeley 
v> Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975), and applied the eight year 
statute of Limitations. Seeley was a case which dealt with an 
order issued from a Utah Order to Show Cause after registration, 
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and did not deal with the registration of the foreign Decree. 
There is no question that in Utah - when a Decree of Divorce is 
entered, an obligation as for alimony becomes a judgment 
essentially when it becomes due and owing. 
However, Defendant asserts that U.C.A. § 78-12-22 does not 
apply because the alimony payments which were owing were not 
rendered to judgment in Washington prior to registration, and were 
not timely rendered to judgment in Utah. In point of fact, Utah 
does not know whether or not they were rendered to judgment in 
Washington, because that was never raised or litigated. If 
Washington does not have an exact statute (similar to the defect in 
the Logan case), then they never were judgments, and only the 
payments which became due and owing after the Utah registration, 
might even become judgments. 
The foreign Decree must be examined in a different light than 
that asserted by the Plaintiff. Accepting Plaintiff7s position, 
once Plaintiff is deemed to have filed the Foreign Decree, the 
following alimony obligations became (at the filing) a judgment, 
because they essentially became judgments each month they were due. 
Seeley found that; 
(because) "the defendant had not paid all of the installments 
for alimony and support as ordered by the decree of divorce. 
The question was raised as to whether the statute of 
limitation applied. This court held that it did and stated, 
"Exception therefore may issue for the arrearages accumulated 
within a period of eight years." [citing to Qpenshaw v. 
Openshaw 105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943),] 
The distinction of Seeley from this instant case can be found 
by examination and application of the Pan Energy case. In Pan 
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Energy, the Supreme Court (referring to the case of Stanford v. 
Utley. 341 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1965)), stated as follows; 
In Stanford, Judge (now Justice) Blackmun wrote: "We feel 
that registration provides, so far as enforcement is 
concerned, the equivalent of a new judgment of the 
registration court." 341 F.2d at 268. Stanford was a diversity 
case in which the court looked to the law of Missouri, the 
state where the judgment had been registered, for the 
applicable statute of limitations. Although the judgment was 
unenforceable in Mississippi, the state where rendered, the 
court allowed enforcement of the judgment because the Missouri 
statute of limitations had not yet expired. 341 F.2d at 268. 
Therefore, under application of this case law, the post-
registration monthly alimony obligations of Defendant (if the 
Decree had been properly filed) would be "new" in Utah. However, 
the old alimony obligations were only "liabilities" because of the 
examination of the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court as to the issue of statute of limitations. 
The application of the statute of limitations - as set forth 
in U.C.A. § 78-12-29 requires that Defendant's alimony obligation 
in Washington be considered only "liability" in Utah because if it 
was not - it would be in conflict with Utah's enforcement doctrine 
- as established in Pan Energy. That is because if a judgment 
opportunity dies under the statute of limitations which has expired 
in the original state of jurisdiction - is capable of resurrection 
or extension in Utah, due to retroactive application of Utah's 
broader code, then essentially only one state's statute will 
effectively bar enforcement — the state with the longest statute -
- forum shopping at it's ugliest. 
Further, it could not be that the new jurisdictional state 
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could also apply the notion that once a foreign matter is rendered 
to judgment (as in Seeley) the longer eight year statute is 
applicable. 
The longer (8-year) statute of limitations should not be 
applicable to alimony awards made in a Decree domesticated in Utah, 
where the arrearages were only a "liability" and not yet reduced to 
judgment. Especially where such judgment would be bared if the 
correct statute of limitations would have been applied. In 
Stanford, Judge (now Justice) Blackmun wrote: "We feel that 
registration provides, so far as enforcement is concerned, the 
equivalent of a new judgment of the registration court," 341 F.2d 
at 268. 
The state of Utah may certainly enforce a valid Judgment from 
another state, and may be empowered in some few cases, to resurrect 
previously dead judgment's which have expired under the original 
state's statutes, but this Court cannot set a policy whereby the 
foreign Court can enter a Judgment which could not have been 
entered in the original state — cannot create a new basis for 
judgment that never existed as a basis in the original state. 
The state of Utah can also act to automatically render to 
judgment future payments as they become due — but it cannot assume 
a fact not before the Court; cannot retroactively apply Utah Code 
to a Decree that was not registered until 1995 in Utah, unless the 
requested amounts had already been rendered to judgment at or 
before the time it was filed in Utah. 
For the Court to be able to do such a thing - by policy - to 
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existed under the jurisdiction at the time of the Decree, would 
create potential chaos for future litigants — and support clear 
forum shopping. 
Suppose a party had a Washington Decree granted in 1975 that 
allowed (by statute) the Plaintiff to collect a $50.00 fine for 
every day that the Defendant was one day late on alimony. Then 
later (in 1980) the state of Washington repealed, as to all prior 
and future Decrees, the statute that allowed such a sanction. The 
Plaintiff would have been unable to collect the sanction in the 
state of Washington, at least from 1980 on. 
Then suppose that subsequently, Utah's legislature adopted the 
same penalty statute, in 1995. Under the application of the law as 
the Trial Court and Appellee would have it, the hypothetical 
Plaintiff could then move to Utah and file the foreign Decree and 
then ask not only for the ongoing late charges (because it would be 
enforceable in Utah), but could also request past due fines for 
every day the Defendant was late for the eight years preceding 1995 
that were previously eliminated in the foreign state. 
In this instant case, Defendant, Mr. Noakes, relied upon the 
application of Washington law — indeed, both parties lived by the 
Washington state of the law — neither paying nor seeking 
collection of the alimony arrearages. Then, the Plaintiff, Mrs. 
Noakes, in retaliation for the visitation matters being addressed, 
sought enforcement and resurrection of the Washington support 
arrearanges, by counterclaiming in Utah. 
Utah law clearly applies to the Decree as though it were a 
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"new" judgment, as for the issue of prospective requests. However, 
there was no information before the court which would enable the 
court to know whether or not the alimony payments could have been 
rendered to "judgment" in Washington, as was required by U.C.A.§ 
78-12-22. 
Simply put, the trial court in Noakes was not enforcing a 
"judgment" from the state of Washington. The trial court looked at 
a foreign Decree and applied Utah law to reach back to a point in 
time when Utah Courts had no jurisdiction over the parties' or the 
subject matter. 
The trial court could not have applied U.C.A. § 78-12-22, 
because it had no information that the past due payments had ever 
been rendered to judgment in Washington state; and for this court 
to render them to judgment would have been like "retroactive" 
filing of the foreign decree, not a registration of a "new" decree 
as is set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Stanford. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The trial court could not have awarded attorney's fees to 
Plaintiff, if it did not have the jurisdiction to issue the 
judgment as to alimony. In as much as the Defendant prevailed on 
his visitation matters, the fees were at worst a wash. 
The Appellate Court typically reviews a trial court's award of 
attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion: 
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his visitation matters, the fees were at worst a wash. 
The Appellate Court typically reviews a trial court's award of 
attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion: 
The decision to make such an award and 
the amount thereof rest primarily in the 
sound discretion of the trial court." 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991). 
In addition the Court in Bell ruled: 
[in order] to permit meaningful review of 
the trial court's discretionary ruling, 
we have consistently encouraged trial courts 
to make findings to explain the factors which 
they considered relevant in arriving at an 
attorney fee award.'" Id. at 494. 
The trial court did not make sufficient Findings to support 
the award of attorney's fees. It is simply insufficient to say that 
it was appropriate in a case to enforce an "order of alimony". 
The Court did not even issue any Findings regarding the 
financial need of the requesting party, and no evidence was placed 
into the record in that regard. 
Further, the Utah Court of Appeals has consistently reversed 
or remanded any final order unsupported by adequate findings of 
fact. 
CONCLUSION 
The award of alimony for a time when the Court did not have 
jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter was 
inappropriate. 
The trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations, as 
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to the issue of alimony. 
The award of attorney's fees was not supported by the findings 
of the court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5 day of June, 1997 
•AKJELOC JL ELC 
:torney for Defenftafvt-Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A' 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
u
^Cowfy, State of Utah. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, A B s w n r H . Clerk 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH V-/V^-ff rj_c^
 DQ^ 
Janine Ray NOAKES, nka LINDSAY; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Charles Leroy NOAKES, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 944402466 
DATE: November 15, 1996 
JUDGE: HOWARD H. MAETANI 
This matter came before the court on October 1, 1996. Plaintiff Janine Ray Noakes, nka 
Lindsay was present and represented by counsel Brent D. Young. Defendant Charles Leroy 
Noakes was present and represented by counsel Rosemond Blakelock. The Court granted 
Plaintiff 15 days to submit an affidavit for attorney fees. Plaintiff was allowed 15 days to 
submit objections to the Trial Memorandum submitted by defendant. Defendant was allowed 
an additional five days to respond to Plaintiffs objection, and Plaintiff was given an 
additional five days to respond. The Court also granted Defendant 15 days to submit proof of 
alimony payments made in 1993, including agreement made with Plaintiffs counsel to pay 
attorney fees in 1992. 
Plaintiff submitted Affidavit for Attorney Fees on October 4, 1996. Defendant submitted 
a Response to Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum with a Notice to Submit on October 21, 1996. 
Defendant failed to submit any proof of alimony payments. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits and arguments 
of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents and being fully advised in the premises now 
makes the following: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
A. Findings of Fact 
1. The parties were married on May 9, 1975 in Los Angeles, California. 
2. The parties obtained a Decree of Dissolution from the Superior Court, State of 
Washington, King County, on or about June 13, 1991. 
3. On or about October 18, 1994, Defendant registered the foreign judgment entitled 
Decree of Dissolution under the Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. §78-22a-l (1953). 
4. On June 5, 1995, defendant petitioned the court to modify the Decree regarding the 
issues of visitation, custody, transportation costs and attorney's fees. 
5. On April 16, 1996, Plaintiff filed an Amended Counterclaim to enforce the support 
order contained in the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement. Plaintiff asserts that 
defendant is delinquent in spousal support payments in the amount of $37,000. See Plaintiffs 
Amended Counterclaim ^ 6. 
6. The court heard oral arguments on October 1, 1996. The remaining unsettled 
issues were alimony and visitation rights of the defendant. The Court will not address the 
issue of visitation until the parties have completed mediation. The Court will address the 
remaining issue of alimony. 
B. Issues 
Plaintiff argues that the court has jurisdiction over the matter of alimony under the Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Annotated §78-22a-l-3 (1953). Plaintiff asks that the 
Decree be enforced and that defendant be ordered to pay delinquent alimony. Defendant 
claims that Plaintiff is not entitled to ask for alimony arrearages because plaintiff failed to 
follow the procedure for foreign judgments under U.C.A. §78-12-29 (1953). 
Defendant claims that plaintiff failed to reduce the alimony to a judgment. Defendant 
argues that plaintiff is now precluded from asking for the delinquent alimony because plaintiff 
failed to request a judgment before the one year statute of limitations expired for such actions 
under U.C.A. §78-22-29 (1953). Defendant claims that his alimony liability expired 
September 1, 1996. 
C. Analysis 
Jurisdiction 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act specifies the procedure to be used when registering a 
foreign judgment in Utah. The Act defines a foreign judgment as "any judgment, decree, or 
order of a court of the United States or of any other court whose acts are entitled to full faith 
and credit in this state." Utah Code Annotated §78-22a-2(l) (1953). Once a foreign 
judgment is filed under the Act, it is given the same treatment and consideration as "a 
judgment of a district court of this state." Utah Code Annotated §78-22a-2-(3) (1953). By 
registering the Decree of Dissolution with the state under the Foreign Judgment Act in 1994, 
Defendant brought the Decree under the jurisdiction of Utah. 
The Decree of Dissolution is comprised of three documents: 1) the Decree of Dissolution; 
2) the Permanent Parenting Plan; and 3) the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement. 
The Decree of Dissolution states that ,f[t]he property and liabilities are distributed as set forth 
in the Separation Agreement which is incorporated herein as if fully set forth." See Decree 6F 
Dissolution, pg. 2, lines 11-13. The Parenting Plan is referred to in similar language earlier in 
the document. See Decree of Dissolution, pg. 1, lines 20-22. The plain language of the 
document implies that by domesticating the Decree of Dissolution, all the documents are 
domesticated, thereby giving the court jurisdiction under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act to 
enforce the agreement. By domesticating the Decree of Dissolution in October, 1994, 
defendant domesticated all three documents comprising the Decree. As a result, plaintiff may 
go forward with her Amended Counterclaim. 
Alimony Arrearages 
Defendant argues that plaintiff is precluded from asking for alimony arrearages because 
§78-12-29 specifies a one year statue of limitations. Defendant claims that plaintiff should 
have asked for a judgment for the arrearages before September 1, 1996. See Response to 
Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum at pg. 6. 
The Court does not find defendant's argument compelling. The argument fails because the 
appropriate statue to apply to the case at hand is U.C.A. §78-12-22 (1953) which states: 
Within eight years: 
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of any state or 
territory within the United States. 
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide support of 
maintenance for dependent children. 
In Seelev v. Park. 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme court ruled that the eight 
year statute of limitations applies to alimony arrearages. In Logan v. Schrieder. 609 P.2d 943 
(Utah 1980) the court determined that an Utah action brought in 1978 to enforce a 1975 Ohio 
action for support arrearages was filed under this section in a timely manner. The current 
plaintiff filed her action for alimony arrearages on or about April 17, 1996 in an Amended 
Counterclaim. The arrearages date from October, 1990, to September, 1995, well within the 
eight year limitation specified in U.C.A. §78-12-22. 
The Separation and Property Settlement, dated November 16, 1990, obligated the 
Defendant to pay the following maintenance payments: 
$1000.00 per month from October 25, 1990, due and payable on the 26th day 
of each month to be paid until August 1992. 
$800.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1992 through 
September 1, 1993. 
$1050.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1993 through 
September 1, 1994. 
$400.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1994 through 
September 1, 1995. 
This arrearage amounts to $30,486.30 including interest. See Affidavit in Support of 
Mot. To Dismiss Petition to Modify: Custody, Visitation, Child Support, at Exhibit A. 
Defendant claims he made some payments which were not credited by Plaintiff. During oral 
arguments on October 1, 1996, Defendant was given 15 days to submit evidence of these 
payments. Defendant failed to submit any evidence of payments. Therefore, the amount in 
arrears remains uncontested. 
Attorney Fees 
Under U.C.A. §30-3-3 (1953), the court may award attorney fees and court costs "in any 
action to enforce an order of ...alimony...in a domestic case." In determining the 
appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees the Court considers the following factors 
specified in Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984); cited in Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417 
(Utah 1986), and in Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987): 
a. necessity of the number of hours dedicated by the attorney; 
b. reasonableness of the rate charged; 
c. rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community; and 
d. financial need of the requesting party. 
Plaintiff had to defend the case, which was originally a petition for custody. Visitation 
and delinquent alimony were later added to the case. Plaintiff prevailed on the issues of 
custody and alimony. Plaintiffs attorney charged fees totaling $3,756.50 plus $130.00 court 
costs. 
The Court finds the attorney's fees and costs incurred by plaintiff in this action to be fair, 
reasonable, and necessary given the complexity of the case, the fees customarily charged for 
similar services in the community, the experience and expertise of counsel, and the type and 
quality of work involved in this matter. 
D. DECISION 
1. The court hereby exercises jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of 
this action. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for alimony arrearages in the amount of $30,486.30 
plus interest at the statutory rate. 
3 Since neither party has submitted Financial Declarations declaring need or 
obligations, the court will focus on the prevailing party to determine the award of attorney's 
fees. Therefore, plaintiff is awarded court costs in the amount of $130.00 and attorney fees in 
the amount of $3,000.00. 
4. Counsel for Plaintiff Janine Ray Noakes, nka Lindsay, is directed to prepare on 
Order consistent with the above Memorandum Decision and submit it to the Court for 
signature. 
DATED at Provo, Utah this / day of November, 1996. 
I 
Fourth District Court Judge 
HOWA ETAN 
cc: Brent D. Young 
Rosemond Blakelock 
APPENDIX "B" 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGEMENT 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
[VIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANINE RAY NOAKES, nka 
LINDSAY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES LEROY NOAKES, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, all parties are 
hereby notified that on the 8th day of January, 1997, judgment in the above-entitled 
matter was entered by the Court, (signed on 6 January, 1997) a full, true and correct copy 
of which is herewith served upon you. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Order). 
Dated this /o_ day of January, 1997. 
BRENT D. YQ0NG' 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 944402466 
Judge: Howard Maetani 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing on the 
day of January, 1997, to Rose Blakelock, Attorney for Defendant, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
Rose Blakelock 
Attorney at Law 
37 E. Center, 2nd floor 
Provo, UT 84606 
BRENT D. YOUNG7 
c:\docs\forms\notenjdt 
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APPENDIX "C" 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
COP/TO CLIENT 
. < ^ „-.-\\ ^ \ 
'M \S 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVTE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah. 84603 
Telephone: (801)375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANTNE RAY NOAKES, nka 
LINDSAY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHARLES LEROY NOAKES, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(HEARING DATE 1 OCTOBER, 1996) 
Civil No. 944402466 
Judge: Howard Maetani 
This matter came before the court on October 1, 1996. Plaintiff Janine Ray 
Noakes, nka Lindsay was present and represented by counsel Brent D. Young. Defendant 
Charles Leroy Noakes was present and represented by counsel Rosemond Blakelock. 
The Court granted plaintiff 15 days to submit an affidavit for attorney fees. Plaintiff was 
allowed 15 days to submit objections to the Trial Memorandum submitted by defendant. 
Defendant was allowed an additional five days to respond to Plaintiffs objection, and" 
plaintiff was given an additional five days to respond. The court also granted defendant 
15 days to submit proof of alimony payments made in 1993, including agreement made 
with plaintiffs counsel to pay attorney fees in 1992. 
Plaintiff submitted Affidavit for Attorney Fees on October 4, 1996. Defendant 
submitted a Response to Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum with a Notice to Submit on 
October 21, 1996. Defendant failed to submit any proof of alimony payments. 
The court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits and 
arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents and being fully advised in the 
premises now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married on May 9, 1975 in Los Angeles, California. 
2. The court finds the parties obtained a Decree of Dissolution from the Superior 
Court, State of Washington, King County, on or about June 13, 1991. 
3. The court finds on or about October 18, 1994, Defendant registered the foreign 
judgment entitled Decree of Dissolution under the Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. §78-
22a-l (1953). 
4. The court finds on June 5, 1995, defendant petitioned the court to modify the 
Decree regarding the issues of visitation, custody, transportation costs and attorney's fees. 
5. The court finds on April 16, 1996, Plaintiff filed an Amended Counterclain^to^ 
enforce the support order contained in the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement 
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Plaintiff asserts that defendant is delinquent in spousal support payments in the amount of 
$37,000. See Plaintiffs Amended Counterclaim paragraph 6. 
6. The court heard oral arguments on October 1, 1996. The remaining unsettled 
issues were alimony and visitation rights of the defendant. The court will not address the 
issue of visitation until the parties have completed mediation. The court will address the 
remaining issue of alimony. 
ISSUES 
7. Plaintiff argued that the court has jurisdiction over the matter of alimony under 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Annotated §78-22a-l-3 (1953). Plaintiff asks 
that the Decree be enforced and that defendant be ordered to pay delinquent alimony. 
Defendant claims that plaintiff is not entitled to ask for alimony arrearage because 
plaintiff failed to follow the procedure for foreign judgments under U.C.A. §78-12-29 
(1953). 
8. Defendant claims that plaintiff failed to reduce the alimony to a judgment. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff is now precluded from asking for the delinquent alimony 
because plaintiff failed to request a judgment before the one year statute of limitations 
expired for such actions under U.C.A. §78-22-29 (1953). Defendant claims that Ms 
alimony liability expired September 1, 1996. 
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ANALYSIS 
Jurisdiction 
9. The court finds the Utah Foreign Judgment Act specifies the procedure to be 
used when registering a foreign judgment in Utah. The Act defines a foreign judgment as 
"any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court 
whose acts are entitled to full faith and credit in this state." Utah Code Annotated §78-
22a-2(l) (1953). Once a foreign judgment is filed under the Act, it is given the same 
treatment and consideration as "a judgment of a district court of this state." Utah Code 
Annotated §78-22a-2-(3) (1953). By registering the Decree of Dissolution with the state 
under the Foreign Judgment Act in 1994, Defendant brought the Decree under the 
jurisdiction of Utah. 
10. The Decree of Dissolution is comprised of three documents: 1) the Decree of 
Dissolution, 2) the Permanent Parenting Plan; and 3) the Separation and Property 
Settlement Agreement. The Decree of Dissolution states that "[t]he property and 
liabilities are distributed as set forth in the Separation Agreement which is incorporated 
herein as if fully set forth." See Decree of Dissolution, pg. 2, lines 11-13. The Parenting 
Plan is referred to in similar language earlier in the document. See Decree of Dissolution? 
pg. 1, lines 20-22. The plain language of the document implies that by domesticating the 
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Decree of Dissolution, all the documents are domesticated, thereby giving the court 
jurisdiction under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act to enforce the agreement. By 
domesticating the Decree of Dissolution in October, 1994, defendant domesticated all 
three documents comprising the Decree. As a result, plaintiff may go forward with her 
Amended Counterclaim. 
ALIMONY ARREARAGE 
11. Defendant argues that plaintiff is precluded from asking for alimony arrearage 
because §78-12-29 specifies a one year statue of limitations. Defendant claims that 
plaintiff should have asked for a judgment for the arrearage before September 1, 1996. 
See Response to Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum at pg. 6. 
12. The Court does not find defendant's argument compelling. The argument fails 
because the appropriate statue to apply to the case at hand is U.C.A. §78-12-22 (1953) 
which states: 
Within eight years: 
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of 
any state or territory within the United States. 
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to 
provide support of maintenance for dependent children. 
In Seelev v. Park. 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court ruled-that 
the eight year statute of limitations applies to alimony arrearage. In Logan v. Schrieder, 
5 
609 P.2d 943 (Utah 1980) the court determined that an Utah action brought in 1978 to 
enforce a 1975 Ohio action for support arrearage was filed under this section in a timely 
manner. The current plaintiff filed her action for alimony arrearage on or about April 17, 
1996 in an Amended Counterclaim. The arrearage date from October, 1990, to 
September, 1995, well within the eight year limitation specified in U.C.A. §78-12-22. 
13. The court finds the Separation and Property Settlement, dated November 16, 
1990, obligated the Defendant to pay the following maintenance payments: 
$1000.00 per month from October 25, 1990, due and payable on the 26th 
day of each month to be paid until August 1992. 
$800.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1992 through 
September 1, 1993. 
$1050.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1993 through 
September 1, 1994. 
$400.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1994 through 
September 1, 1995. 
14. The court finds this arrearage amounts to $30,486.30 including interest. See 
Affidavit in Support of Motion To Dismiss Petition to Modify: Custody, Visitation, Child 
Support, at Exhibit A. Defendant claims he made some payments which were not 
credited by Plaintiff. During oral arguments on October 1, 1996, Defendant was given. 15. 
days to submit evidence of these payments. Defendant failed to submit any evidence of 
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payments. Therefore, the amount in arrears remains uncontested. 
Attorney Fees 
15. The court finds under U.C.A. §30-3-3 (1953), the court may award attorney 
fees and court costs "in any action to enforce an order of... alimony ... in a domestic 
case." In determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees the court 
considers the following factors specified in Beals v. Beals. 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984); 
cited in Huck v. Huck 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986), and in Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 85 
(Utah App. 1987): 
a. necessity of the number of hours dedicated by the attorney; 
b. reasonableness of the rate charged; 
c. rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community; and 
d. financial need of the requesting party. 
16. The court finds plaintiff had to defend the case, which was originally a 
petition for custody. Visitation and delinquent alimony were later added to the case. 
Plaintiff prevailed on the issues of custody and alimony. Plaintiffs attorney charged fees 
totaling $3,756.50 plus $130.00 court costs. 
17. The court finds the attorney's fees and costs incurred by plaintiff in this action^ 
to be fair, reasonable, and necessary given the complexity of the case, the fees 
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customarily charged for similar services in the community, the experience and expertise 
of counsel, and the type and quality of work involved in this matter. 
18. The court finds it shall exercise jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter of this action. 
19. The court finds plaintiff shall be awarded a judgment for alimony arrearage in 
the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX DOLLARS and 
30/100 ($30,486.30), plus interest at the statutory rate. 
20. The court finds since neither party has submitted Financial Declarations 
declaring need or obligations, the court shall focus on the prevailing party to determine 
the award of attorneys fees. Therefore, plaintiff shall be awarded court costs in the 
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS ($130.00) and attorney fees in the 
amount of THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($3,000.00). 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) That the court exercises jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of 
this action; 
(2) That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant for alimony 
arrearage in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX and 
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30/100 ($30,486.30), plus interest at the statutory rate; 
(3) That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant for court costs in 
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS (S 130.00) and for attorney's fees in 
the amount of THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS (53,000.00). 
Dated this L? day^f ^ltisiA_ , 199_{7\ 
Approved as to form: 
hi 
ROSE BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for Defendant 
RACOMMON\HEATHER\LNDSYJOF« 
(ftUZ£>£a*i: 
HOWARD H. MAETANI 
% 
COUR'' * My 
9 
APPENDIX "D" 
ORDER 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVTE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANINE RAY NOAKES, nka I 
LINDSAY, 
ORDER (HEARING DATE 1 
Plaintiff, OCTOBER, 1996) 
v. Civil No. 944402466 
Judge: Howard Maetani 
CHARLES LEROY NOAKES, 
Defendant. | 
This matter came before the court on October 1, 1996. Plaintiff Janine Ray 
Noakes, nka Lindsay was present and represented by counsel Brent D. Young. Defendant 
Charles Leroy Noakes was present and represented by counsel Rosemond Blakelock. 
The Court granted plaintiff 15 days to submit an affidavit for attorney fees. Plaintiff was 
allowed 15 days to submit objections to the Trial Memorandum submitted by defendant. 
Defendant was allowed an additional five days to respond to Plaintiffs objection,- and 
plaintiff was given an additional five days to respond. The court also granted defendant 
15 days to submit proof of alimony payments made in 1993, including agreement made 
with plaintiffs counsel to pay attorney fees in 1992. 
Plaintiff submitted Affidavit for Attorney Fees on October 4, 1996. Defendant 
submitted a Response to Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum with a Notice to Submit on 
October 21, 1996. Defendant failed to submit any proof of alimony payments. 
The court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits and 
arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents, being fully advised in the 
premises, and based upon the accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
now makes the following: 
ORDER 
. 1. The court exercises jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this 
action. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant for alimony arrearage in the 
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX and 30/100 
($30,486.30), plus interest at the statutory rate. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant for court costs in the 
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS (S130.00) and for attorney's fees in the 
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amount of THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($3,000.00). 
Dated this L day / J)rCM^, 199_ 
I I 
l £p_  / ^ J j 
Approved as to form: 
ROSE BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for Defendant 
COURT: 
/nw^o^-£.' (Piajt&»LL 
Vj*7T'f+-<>*yML. MAETANI 
H:\COMMON\HEATHER\LNDSY.ORDa 
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